UKDF calls for RAF to hand over F-35Bs to Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm

UK F-35 Procurement and The Ongoing Case for Independence of the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm

Ever since its inception as the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) in 1914, two years behind the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm (FAA) has been a critical component of Britain’s maritime power, yet its operational independence from the Royal Air Force (RAF) has been a recurring point of contention. Historical and contemporary examples, from the 1920s and 30s right the way through to much more recent Lockheed Martin F-35 procurement decisions, underscore the need for the FAA to maintain full autonomy to ensure effective naval aviation tailored to modern and bespoke maritime needs.

In the lead-up to World War II, the FAA suffered under RAF control, a situation beginning in 1918 when the Royal Naval Air Service was merged (with the RFC) into the newly formed RAF. By the 1930s, this arrangement had led to neglect of naval aviation. The RAF prioritised what became four-engined heavy bombers such as the Lancaster, and monoplane fighters like the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire for air defence, leaving the FAA with increasingly outdated aircraft like the Gloster Sea Gladiator biplane. The Royal Navy found it easier to design and build purpose-built ships, HMS Ark Royal and then the Illustrious-class, than to secure funds for modern, purpose-built aircraft. Indeed, this dichotomy led to the RN’s armouring their newest carriers on quite an unusual scale by peer standards, as they trusted the armour to protect the ships more than they trusted the embarked air group to do so, though the high degree of armour protection necessarily limited the size of the air group!

The FAA’s full return to Admiralty control as later as May 1939 was too late to rectify these deficiencies, highlighting the dangers of subordinating naval aviation to RAF priorities. The sterling successes of the ancient-looking (though 1936 vintage) Swordfish (“Stringbag”) torpedo bomber in the early years  of the War against the Bismarck and the Italian Fleet at Taranto rather mask the lack of effective fighters and bombers which could make a real, all-round difference in such campaigns as Norway and early operations in the Mediterranean. Often in early years of the war, RN carriers acted as glorified aircraft transports, flying off RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes sent to reinforce Malta for example. The Seafire (the naval version of the Spitfire) proved too lightweight but, tellingly, fighter imports from the US such as the Martlet (later Wildcat), Corsair and the Hellcat all became increasingly important to the RN, especially as the war switched to the Far East, with British aircraft as the Barracuda dive-bomber enjoying more mixed success, with the American Avenger becoming the favoured torpedo-bomber by war end. Interestingly (and certainly in a break from US practice post WW2), RAF Coastal Command and successors has always retained responsibility for land-based maritime reconnaissance, anti-ship missions and ASW. 

Post-war, the FAA maintained its independence, with the Royal Navy operating five aircraft carriers (Ark Royal, Centaur, Hermes, Eagle and Victorious) into the mid 1960s and pioneering in the process the use of jet aircraft on aircraft carriers with developments such as the steam-powered catapult, angled flight deck and the mirror landing aid. However, this all rather disguised the underlying obsolescence/small size of all these carriers and in the 1950s and 1960s, the RN’s UK-built carrier aircraft achieved decidedly mixed results, reflecting both innovation and limitations in then British aerospace capabilities. Aircraft such as the de Havilland Sea Venom, Supermarine Scimitar, de Havilland Sea Vixen, and Blackburn Buccaneer represented significant steps forward in their own way. However, many of these platforms were compromised by design or doctrinal constraints, short range, limited payloads, or complex maintenance requirements, driven in part by the Navy's increasingly outdated carriers and the UK’s declining industrial investment in naval aviation. The Sea Vixen, for instance, was pioneering as a twin-boom all-weather fighter, but suffered from reliability and handling challenges. The Buccaneer, by contrast, ultimately emerged as a standout success: a low-level strike aircraft tailored for maritime mission though it only fully realised its potential after fully transferring to the RAF in the 1970s.

The mid 1960s proved to be an extremely tough time for the RN/FAA against the broader backdrop of UK economic decline, imperial retreat and focus on what would now be called NATO First.  Setbacks came thick and fast: the cancellation of the Hawker Siddeley P1154 supersonic VSTOL fighter, the cancellation of the CVA-01 aircraft carrier programme and the 1966 decision to run-down fixed wing aviation completely, which resulted in the premature decommissioning of HMS Victorious and HMS Eagle, with only HMS Ark Royal soldiering on until 1978, using Buccaneers and heavily modified McDonnell Douglas Phantom models that would go on to serve with the RAF. One apocryphal story about the cancellation of CVA-01 even states that the RAF moved Australia by 500 miles in its advocacy to support the RAF's preferred strategy of land-based, long-range F-111 aircraft, themselves cancelled in 1968

Royal Navy fixed wing naval aviation didn’t, however, disappear and made a quick return in a new form in the late 1970s, with the “through-deck”, ASW cruiser concept, as modified by the ingenious ski-jump, which were later rightly identified as light aircraft carriers, using Sea Harriers derived from the RAF’s longer-standing Harrier ground-attack aircraft. The first of the three light carriers, HMS Invincible (almost sold to Australia in 1982) operated alongside the veteran HMS Hermes in the Falklands War of 1982 – an operation that wouldn’t simply have been possible without fixed wing naval aviation, with Sea Harriers downing 20 Argentinian aircraft.

The success of the Sea Harrier in the Falklands led to orders for the “FA2” variant, even better suited to the needs of naval warfare, albeit as a subsonic aircraft. The Sea Harrier FA2 was fitted with the Blue Vixen radar, which was described as one of the most advanced pulse doppler radar systems in the world and later formed the basis of the Eurofighter Typhoon's CAPTOR radar. It also carried the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile, the first UK aircraft with this capability, was fitted with an upgraded Mk 106 Pegasus engine and in response to the threat of radar-based anti-aircraft weapons electronic countermeasures were added.

However, joint arrangements persisted in some areas, notably with the Harrier Force. From the 1970s, the RAF and FAA operated the Harrier GR and Sea Harrier, respectively, under a shared command structure Joint Force Harrier from 2000. While this collaboration maximised resources, it created tensions. The RAF often prioritised land-based operations, sidelining naval requirements. During the Falklands War in 1982, the Sea Harrier proved decisive in defending the fleet, yet its development and funding had been constrained by RAF oversight.

The Sea Harriers were prematurely retired in 2006 as money could not be found to upgrade the engines for both them and the RAF’s Harriers. In practice, the RAF’s Harrier GR9s were themselves prematurely retired in 2011 after the 2010 SDSR (in a trade-off against retention of the RAF’s Panavia Tornado GR4s). 2010-11 thus left the FAA (for whom the Tornados were useless) without any fixed-wing capability until the promised arrival of the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II.

The 1997 Strategic Defence Review committed the Royal Navy to build two large fleet aircraft carriers which were expressly designed around what became the new, VSTOL-oriented F-35B and ski-jumps. In 2010 it was announced that catapult and arrestor gear (CATOBAR) would be installed to accommodate the F-35C carrier variant rather than the short-take off and vertical-landing F-35B. However, this decision was reversed in 2012, albeit with the two aircraft carriers still in theory capable of being retrofitted with CATOBAR gear at a later date.

In 2013 it was announced that the entire British fleet of F-35B aircraft would be operated jointly by the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm and be based at RAF Marham. Since the commissioning of HMS Queen Elizabeth in 2017 and HMS Prince of Wales in 2019, the UK’s acquisition of F-35Bs has been painfully slow, with only 48 of the 138 due to be delivered by the end of 2025 and one loss in the Mediterranean in 2021. Each aircraft carrier can accommodate up to 36 F-35Bs but 24 has become the expected norm. At the same time, the RAF naturally wishes to use the F-35B as a land-based asset.

The UK government’s decision, announced in the recent SDR, to include 12 F-35A aircraft in its second phase of 27 F-35 purchases (15 F-35Bs and 12 F-35As, to be delivered by 2033) marks a significant shift in defence strategy. This move, balancing cost, capability, and NATO commitments, has sparked debate about its impact on the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm (FAA) and broader UK military priorities.

The F-35A offers some compelling benefits, starting with cost. Priced roughly 15% lower than the F-35B, with 8% cheaper operating costs, the F-35A delivers savings that could fund critical defence programmes, such as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). The UK Ministry of Defence estimates a 25% per-aircraft cost reduction, freeing resources for other priorities.

Strategically, the F-35A enables the UK to rejoin NATO’s nuclear-sharing mission by carrying the B61-12 nuclear bomb internally, a capability absent since the retirement of the WE.177 bomb in 1998. This strengthens the UK’s role alongside allies like Germany and Italy, enhancing NATO’s deterrence posture.

The F-35A’s superior range and payload, unencumbered by the F-35B’s short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) systems, make it more suitable for long-range strikes and extended training sorties. At RAF Marham, the F-35A’s lower maintenance needs and longer endurance could accelerate pilot training for 207 Squadron, addressing delays in building frontline F-35B aircrew due to budget constraints.

However, the decision to procure F-35As comes with significant trade-offs, particularly for the FAA. Unlike the F-35B, the F-35A cannot operate from the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, critical to the UK’s Carrier Enabled Power Projection strategy. With only 62 F-35Bs now planned by 2033, the reduced number exacerbates the risk of limited carrier air wing capacity and attrition reserves. This potential starving of the FAA of F-35Bs echoes what happened with Joint Harrier Force 20 years ago - and has led to the MOD trying to rationalise and compensate for this situation by suggesting that full use of the 65,000 tonne Queen Elizabeth class’ capacity might be made by fitting UAVs and even, bizarrely, deck-launched missiles. 

Logistically, introducing a second F-35 variant complicates training, maintenance, and supply chains. Air-to-air refuelling poses a major challenge: the F-35A relies on boom refuelling, unsupported by the UK’s Voyager tankers which use the probe-and-drogue system, forcing dependence on USAF support or expensive (unplanned and budgeted) retrofits, although the latter would be preferable given the number of other RAF aircraft that now cannot be refuelled by its Voyager tanker fleet.

The nuclear role, while symbolically significant, adds limited value given the UK’s Trident-based deterrent. The small F-35A fleet would struggle to sustain a credible nuclear mission, and reliance on US-controlled B61-12 bombs reduces autonomy. Furthermore, the F-35A purchase could strain budgets for GCAP or additional Eurofighter Typhoons, potentially weakening long-term air combat capabilities.

The Joint Harrier Force of the 2000s highlights the dangers of divided aviation priorities between the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm. RAF oversight frequently sidelined naval requirements, culminating in the Sea Harrier’s premature retirement in 2006, which left the FAA without fixed-wing capability until the F-35B’s introduction. The recent decision to procure 12 F-35As risks repeating this historical error by prioritising RAF-centric missions over the Royal Navy’s maritime airpower needs. While the F-35A offers cost savings, enhanced training opportunities, and a NATO nuclear role, it introduces logistical complexities and reduces the number of F-35Bs, which are critical for carrier operations. This echoes past mistakes, such as those seen in the pre-World War II era, where split priorities weakened overall defence capabilities.

The FAA’s unique role in projecting power at sea demands autonomy to align training, procurement, and doctrine with naval strategy. History shows that subordinating it to the RAF leads to misaligned priorities, as seen in the 1930s and with the Joint Harrier Force. Current F-35 procurement decisions risk repeating these mistakes. Granting the FAA full independence would safeguard Britain’s maritime strength in an increasingly contested global environment.