Ten takeaways from the UK Strategic Defence & Security review
1) AUKUS Submarines will arrive slowly. The BAE Systems dockyard at Barrow-
in-Furness is currently completing the build of the last Astute class submarine,
which will have taken at least nine years, and has started building the
Dreadnought Class SSBNs which will start to come into service in the 2030s
replacing the Vanguard class boats. This SDSR commits the UK to building “up
to” 12 new SSN attack submarines under the AUKUS partnership, to replace the
seven Astutes when they start to go out of service in the mid-2030s. The long
drawn-out Astute programme will have taken 25 years to deliver just seven boats
from the laying down of the first in 2001. That will mean building nearly one new
submarine every 18 months. Barrow has not proved itself capable of building at
such speed, with the Astute class taking up to 12 years each. We will need to
reopen new shipyards, such as Camel Laird in Birkenhead which has past
experience of building nuclear powered submarines, to get all the AUKUS boats
to arrive within an acceptable timeframe, otherwise it will be 2055 before all 12
boats are in service.
2) The Royal Navy is short of escorts. In 1979, the Royal Navy had a fleet
containing 65 destroyers and frigates. It has just 14 today: six Type 45
destroyers and eight remaining elderly Type 23 frigates, which are currently being
replaced by eight Type 26 and five less capable Type 31 frigates. The current
plans do not increase those numbers beyond 13, with the two production lines
expected to close in the mid-2030s. When you consider the rule of three (one
ship deployed, one being prepared and the other being refitted), we have at most
five frigates and destroyers available at any one time. Extending the production
runs of both the Type 26 and Type 31s to a ensure a total of 25 escorts in the
fleet would raise this to 8 or 9 deployable.
3) Arming the aircraft carriers. We have seen the effectiveness of drone warfare
in the Ukraine. Equipping our aircraft carriers with autonomous vehicles as well
as aircraft makes sense. Our carriers are well supported by F35B fighter aircraft
which can shoot down drones and cruise missiles as well as having surveillance
and intelligence gathering capabilities. While the F35B can deliver a smartbomb,
our Carrier Strike Group lacks strike capability, with SPEAR 3 air-to-surface
missiles yet to be integrated. Yet the UK Government’s views on aircraft carriers
carrying missiles seems confused, with such approaches having failed with the
former Soviet Kiev class “heavy aviation cruisers” and the initial fitting of Sea Dart
missiles to the RN’s Invincible class of small aircraft carriers as well as the
abandonment of early plans to equip them with Exocet missiles. The review
makes no mention of extending the range of F35Bs through use of autonomous
air-to-air refuelling, such as the USN’s MQ-25 Stingray but is exploring the urgent
need to a replace the helicopter-based Crowsnest AEW with a drone or
unmanned solution.
4) Too few Navy Aircraft. The Government originally committed to buying 138
F35Bs for the RAF and Royal Navy. Yet our current order takes us up to just 48
F35Bs, the less nimble brother of the F35As which are unable to carry large
bombs stealthily and are not catapult-equipped like the F35Cs. To rub salt in the
wound, the UK only has 34 trained F35 pilots. The SDSR has indicated that any
future order would split between land based F35As (possibly equipped with
tactical nuclear weapons) and F35Bs. However, the Royal Navy requires at least
72 F35Bs (plus attrition replacements) to equip both aircraft carriers.
5) A diminished Royal Airforce. There has been no commitment by the
Government to order new Typhoons as the Tranche 1 Eurofighter Typhoons are
taken out of service this year, unlike partner nations Italy, Germany and Spain.
The new Tempest fighter aircraft are not due to enter service until 2035.
6) No mention of helicopters. With the retirement of the Puma and older Chinook,
and limited numbers of Merlins in service, the UK armed forces are facing a
shortage of helicopters.
7) No new transport aircraft. The Hercules has been prematurely withdrawn and
the RAF has a shortfall in air transport capacity. While the report suggests
augmenting the fleet with a purchase of additional Airbus A400M Atlas C1
airlifters, no commitments are being made. Partnerships with private providers to
provide additional airlift capacity for missions not requiring a full military
specification aircraft would then free more of the A400M, C-17 Globemaster III,
and A330 Voyager fleet for ‘higher end’ taskings. There was also no mention of
equipping the UK Atlas fleet for air-to-air refuelling nor of the Voyager with the
boom system needed to refuel P8 Poseidon, E7 Wedgetail and future F35
aircraft.
8) No vision for the army. It is not clear whether the government thinks it needs a
bigger army or not. Yet the Ukraine conflict has taught us that troop numbers
matter.
9) Munitions always on. The SDR recommends an ‘always-on’ production strategy
that provides continuous manufacture and delivery of munitions to ensure
capacity always exists and can be scaled up if necessary. This would represent
an improvement to present practice where weapons are ordered in batches and
only produced when necessary, leaving gaps where production facilities can lay
dormant and may be converted for other uses or closed in their entirety.
10) Low on aspiration, low on commitment. An aspiration to spend 3 per cent of
GDP when many, including the Pentagon, think the UK should be at 5 per cent, is
itself undermined by the failure of the Government even to commit to spending
this much. Over fifteen years, the last Government cut money for defence in real
terms and dramatically reduced the size and capabilities of our armed forces.
Spending 4 per cent of GDP on defence would get us to the point where we are
actually growing our armed forces, rather than shrinking them.