Towards a Sovereign British Space Strategy: Safeguarding National Security in Orbit

The United Kingdom stands at a pivotal juncture in space policy. As global powers vie for dominance in orbit, the UK’s defence and security imperatives demand a robust, sovereign space strategy. This approach must prioritise the ability to act independently, foster a domestic military-industrial complex, and ensure resilience against emerging threats. UK Defence First advocates for defence as the government’s foremost priority, encompassing sea, air, land, space, and cyber domains. A sovereign space strategy aligns with this vision by enabling unilateral action, bolstering UK industrial capabilities, cooperating with allies like AUKUS, Five Eyes, and NATO, maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent, protecting against cyber threats, and delivering flexible procurement. Recent proposals to weaken international satellite interference protections underscore the urgency, as they risk eroding strategic autonomy and exposing critical assets to foreign dominance.

Britain’s space heritage offers valuable lessons. In the post-war era, the UK pioneered ambitious programmes that demonstrated its technical leadership. The Black Knight rocket, developed in the 1950s, tested re-entry vehicles for ballistic missiles. Blue Streak followed as a medium-range ballistic missile, later repurposed for the Europa launcher under European collaboration. Black Arrow achieved a milestone in 1971 by launching Prospero, making the UK the sixth nation to orbit a satellite indigenously. The Ariel programme, spanning 1962 to 1979, produced six scientific satellites in partnership with NASA, advancing atmospheric and ionospheric research. Militarily, Skynet satellites, first launched in 1969, provided secure communications for the armed forces, evolving into today's Skynet 6. Even the Zircon spy satellite project in the 1980s highlighted aspirations for independent intelligence gathering, though it was cancelled amid budget constraints. Uniquely, the UK remains the only nation to have developed and then relinquished sovereign launch capability, shifting to reliance on foreign providers like the US and Europe. This historical retreat from self-sufficiency now impacts contemporary strategy, as dependence on external systems amplifies vulnerabilities in an increasingly contested domain.

Today, space is integral to defence operations. Satellites underpin command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), navigation, and communications. The Ministry of Defence relies on a mix of geostationary orbit (GSO) networks for persistent coverage and non-geostationary orbit (NGSO) constellations for low-latency connectivity. However, proposed changes to Equivalent Power Flux Density (EPFD) limits and other interference protection criteria at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) threaten this ecosystem. These rules have long limited the amount of interference that NGSO systems, such as SpaceX’s Starlink or Amazon’s Kuiper, can cause to other satellite networks. These safeguards enable spectrum sharing without degrading performance.

Advocates for weakening these rules, primarily US-based giants like SpaceX and Amazon, argue for doing so to enhance their NGSO capacity. However, such changes would have severe military impacts. Weakened limits would preclude the ability to use small user terminals on GSO networks and could also impair GSO coverage by up to 50% in critical regions, including the Middle East and South America, by removing interference protections below 25-degree elevation angles. This would disrupt drone operations, manpack communications, and surveillance, leading to outages that compromise situational awareness and endanger lives. For instance, GSO systems deliver 99.99% availability for tactical missions, but increased NGSO interference might reduce this to well below 90%, causing cascading failures in weapons systems like command and control or nuclear enterprise networks critical to the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent. NGSO vulnerabilities, such as susceptibility to jamming and kinetic attacks, compound risks when over-reliance on foreign providers emerges.

Yielding to these proposed changes would cede control of space to a few non-UK entities. Putting aside the aspirations for 1 million space data centres, Starlink, with nearly 50,000 communications satellites, and Amazon's planned 13,000, alone would dominate use of space, backed by immense capital inaccessible to smaller players like Eutelsat’s OneWeb. Without continued EPFD and other interference limits, UK forces might be forced to depend on these two firms for connectivity, limiting options for small antennas essential to modern warfare. This would erode UK strategic autonomy in a time of strained transatlantic relationships, forcing the UK to seek approval from foreign operators during crises, potentially at inflated costs or under unfavourable terms. Cyber security suffers too: unstable links invite exploitation, blurring accidental interference from malicious attacks, and compelling switches to vulnerable backups. As the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill progresses through Parliament, and the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill looms, policymakers must address this mismatch between domestic resilience goals and these efforts to change longstanding international provisions that limit damaging interference.

China’s rapid NGSO expansion, mirroring US efforts, heightens the stakes. Beijing’s constellations aim to rival American dominance, integrating military and commercial assets for global influence. Degraded interference limits could amplify adversarial advantages, as state-backed systems could exploit interference to deny UK access. The military impact analysis details threats across domains: electronic jamming, cyber operations like spoofing, and kinetic weapons such as anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles. Satellite networks incorporating GSO elements, with fixed positions, offer enhanced reliability against; distributed attacks against NGSOs. Moreover, the UK, lacking a sovereign launch capability, risks being sidelined in this multi-orbit contest.

To counter these threats, Britain requires a sovereign space strategy grounded in national interests. This should employ an 'ends-ways-means' framework to assess

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic dimensions of space power. It should prioritise building industrial capabilities: invest in domestic launch from sites like SaxaVord or Sutherland, revive satellite manufacturing through firms like Surrey Satellite Technology, and grow a UK-based industrial base to supply Britain’s military needs. This ensures value-for-money procurement and flexibility, reducing vendor lock-in.

Cooperation remains vital. Align with AUKUS for technology sharing, Five Eyes for intelligence, and NATO for collective defence in space. Yet, sovereignty demands the ability to act alone, including maintaining Skynet for independent communications and protecting the nuclear deterrent’s satellite-dependent elements. Cyber protections must integrate space assets as critical infrastructure, with resilience against interference baked into designs.

Opposing efforts to degrade interference limits at the 2026 ITU Plenipotentiary and 2027 World Radiocommunication Conference is imperative. Ofcom, leading the UK delegation, should advocate for maintaining longstanding protections to preserve multi-orbit diversity. By investing in sovereign capabilities, the UK can deter adversaries and secure orbital autonomy.

Britain’s space legacy demands revival through a strategy that prioritises defence first. Weakened interference protections risk ceding autonomy to foreign powers, but proactive measures can restore much needed independence. The government must act now to safeguard space as a domain of British national interests.