Could the UK Have Built a Solo Fighter from the EAP Instead of Joining the Eurofighter Typhoon?

The British Aerospace Experimental Aircraft Programme (EAP) of the 1980s stands as a proud demonstration of British engineering excellence. Largely funded and led by the United Kingdom, this technology demonstrator proved the feasibility of advanced features such as canard-delta wing layouts, digital fly-by-wire controls, and extensive use of composite materials. Yet Britain ultimately chose the multinational Eurofighter Typhoon path alongside Germany, Italy and Spain.

What if the UK had pressed ahead alone with a full-production fighter evolved directly from the EAP baseline, much like the proposed P.110 design? Drawing on France’s independent Rafale programme as a realistic benchmark, the analysis compares costs, timelines and export outcomes. All figures are approximate and have been adjusted to 2026 equivalents using data from the National Audit Office, defence reviews and open-source reports.

The Cost Equation: Sharing Burdens versus Cutting Red Tape

Multinational programmes inevitably bring higher coordination costs, work-share negotiations and design compromises. A solo British effort would have shouldered the full development bill but avoided many of those overheads.

In reality, the Eurofighter Typhoon’s consortium-wide development cost reached approximately €18–20 billion (£15–17 billion). The UK’s 33 per cent share amounted to €6–7 billion (£5–6 billion). When production, support and upgrades are included, Britain’s total commitment for 160 aircraft exceeded £40 billion by the early 2020s, with recent ECRS Mk2 radar enhancements alone adding £2.35 billion. Unit costs settled at £73–90 million flyaway, rising to £126 million once amortised development was factored in. Overruns proved substantial: the original UK plan for 250 aircraft at £7 billion ballooned to £20 billion for 160 jets - a 75 per cent increase per aircraft.

Had Britain proceeded alone from the EAP, development costs would likely have fallen in the £15–25 billion range – two to three times the UK’s Typhoon share, yet free of multinational friction. Total programme expenditure for 160–250 aircraft might have reached £30–50 billion, potentially £5–10 billion lower than the actual Typhoon outlay thanks to streamlined decision-making. Unit costs would have been higher initially (£90–150 million) because of a smaller launch order, but lifecycle expenses could have mirrored the Rafale’s more economical €15,000–20,000 per flight hour versus the Typhoon’s €20,000–70,000. Overruns, estimated at 20–30 per cent, would probably have been 30–50 per cent milder without partner disputes.

In short, the multinational route delivered genuine cost-sharing, yet a national programme offered the realistic prospect of £5–15 billion in overall savings through greater efficiency, albeit with higher upfront risk.

Timelines: Multinational Gridlock versus National Agility

European collaborative projects have a well-documented history of slippage. The Eurofighter suffered 54 months of delays, pushing initial operational capability from the mid-1990s to 2003. Radar selection rows, work-share arguments and post-Cold War budget cuts all played their part.

A solo UK programme built on the EAP’s mature data could have accelerated development by one to two years. Decision-making on engines, avionics and upgrades would have rested solely in British hands, cutting bureaucratic layers. France’s Rafale, developed independently after withdrawing from early European talks, slipped by roughly five years against its original schedule - a benchmark that suggests a British national fighter might have entered service three to five years earlier than the Typhoon. Domestic political or budgetary pressures could still have posed risks, as the cancellation of EAP’s second prototype illustrated, but the absence of four-nation consensus would have removed the single biggest source of delay.

Export Potential: Full Sovereignty, Greater Rewards

Exports transform defence programmes from cost centres into economic engines. The Typhoon has secured roughly 171 overseas orders, generating £30–40 billion in contracts. With its 37 per cent work-share, the UK has earned approximately £30 billion in revenue against a £12 billion investment – a respectable 2.5-fold return – while supporting 20,000–40,000 jobs and delivering £1.4 billion in annual GDP uplift.

Under a solo scenario, every export pound would have stayed in Britain. Assuming the same 171-aircraft export volume and £30–40 billion contract value, cumulative revenue could have reached £81 billion, with an annual GDP contribution of £3.8 billion and total economic multipliers of £40–60 billion. Jobs supported might have climbed to 54,000–108,000. The return on investment would have improved dramatically to five-to-seven times the initial £15–25 billion outlay, with tax receipts potentially recovering 50–80 per cent of costs. Full export sovereignty would have eliminated partner vetoes, echoing the Rafale’s €30 billion-plus overseas success that sustains 7,000–18,000 French jobs.

The downside, of course, lies in sales risk. Without allied governments providing diplomatic leverage, some markets might have proved harder to penetrate.

Nevertheless, the net economic gain for the UK could have been £10–50 billion higher once programme costs were offset against the larger benefit stream.

Conclusion: Lessons for Tempest and Beyond

The multinational Eurofighter Typhoon was a pragmatic response to the strategic and fiscal realities of the late 1980s and 1990s. It spread risk, secured a capable frontline fighter and delivered solid, if shared, economic returns. Yet the hypothetical solo path from the EAP baseline reveals compelling alternatives: potential savings of £5–15 billion, service entry three to five years sooner, and substantially amplified export and industrial benefits.

Today, as the UK leads the Tempest programme in partnership with Italy and Japan, these historical insights remain highly relevant. Collaboration still offers vital risk-sharing, but the EAP experience underscores the value of preserving national leadership, minimising bureaucracy and safeguarding sovereign export freedom. In an era of tightening budgets and intensifying global competition, striking the right balance between partnership and independence may prove the decisive factor in delivering the next generation of British combat air power.