UK defence and critical infrastructure face grave risks from US move to weaken vital satellite rules
The United States is advancing plans to overhaul long-established international regulations designed to protect satellite communications from harmful interference. British security experts warn that the changes could severely compromise the United Kingdom’s ability to defend itself, maintain critical national infrastructure and preserve strategic autonomy in an increasingly contested space domain.
On 8 April 2026, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced its intention to replace the decades-old Equivalent Power Flux Density (EPFD) framework with new performance-based criteria and voluntary private agreements between operators. The proposal, to be considered at the FCC’s open meeting later this month, would permit non-geostationary orbit (NGSO) satellites - chiefly massive low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations - to transmit at significantly higher power levels. This risks disrupting the reliable operation of geostationary (GSO) satellites that currently underpin many essential UK services.
The stakes for Britain are substantial. Government data indicate that nearly 20 per cent of the UK economy relies on space-based services, while the National Risk Register highlights disruption to satellite-dependent systems as a major vulnerability. Defence operations, intelligence gathering, emergency services, energy networks, aviation, maritime safety and financial systems all depend heavily on stable satellite links. Many of these capabilities, particularly those using geostationary orbit, would become far more vulnerable under the proposed regime.
Modern warfare provides a stark illustration of the dangers. Recent conflicts have shown that reliable satellite communications are indispensable for command and control, intelligence, surveillance and targeting. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, one of the earliest actions was a cyber-attack on commercial satellite infrastructure that produced Europe-wide effects. British forces, like those of other Nato allies, make extensive use of commercial satellite services across multiple domains. A temporary loss of connectivity during a critical operation - for example, a forward unit calling in urgent support - could have fatal consequences. Similar disruptions would ripple across aviation, maritime operations and essential civilian infrastructure.
The current EPFD rules, coordinated globally through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), exist precisely to enable satellites in different orbits to operate together without one blinding the signals of another. They impose technical limits on signal strength and interference, ensuring that a fast-moving LEO satellite passing beneath a stationary GSO platform does not overwhelm its receivers. These safeguards have allowed the successful deployment of more than 11,000 LEO satellites while preserving the high reliability demanded by defence and critical national infrastructure.
The landscape has shifted dramatically with the emergence of very large LEO constellations. Elon Musk’s Starlink now controls more than 10,000 satellites and aims for 100,000 and potentially more, dwarfing the combined total of all other active satellites worldwide. Proposed mega-constellations from other major players would further concentrate orbital and spectrum resources. Only a handful of entities - giant commercial firms or state-backed programmes - possess the capital and technical capacity to sustain such systems. The financial and operational barriers are immense.
Advocates of reform argue that the existing rules, rooted in 1990s assumptions, now impede innovation and the delivery of high-speed, low-latency broadband, especially to underserved areas. They claim the new approach could deliver substantially greater capacity, reduced costs and significant economic gains – potentially more than $2 billion for the United States alone - while still safeguarding GSO operations through negotiated coordination.
Opponents, however, caution that replacing binding EPFD protections with voluntary private bargaining would effectively confer gatekeeper power on the largest LEO operators, the biggest player being Musk’s Starlink. Smaller providers and multi-orbit systems could be forced to seek permission from dominant players to maintain service quality. In a worst-case scenario, the United Kingdom could find its defence and critical communications increasingly dependent on the goodwill of one or two foreign-owned entities whose priorities may not align with British national interests.
The issue is moving rapidly up the international agenda. Discussions are expected at the ITU’s Plenipotentiary Conference in Doha later this year, with a final decision anticipated at the World Radiocommunication Conference in Shanghai in 2027. The United Kingdom has not yet adopted a formal position, despite the clear implications for national security. Ofcom, which leads UK delegations at these forums, will be central to determining Britain’s stance.
Weakened protections could introduce frequent communications dropouts, delays or forced system resets at moments when reliability is paramount. Even brief interruptions would impair command structures, create surveillance gaps, slow decision-making and reduce situational awareness. In extreme cases, lives could be placed at direct risk.
The effects would extend well beyond the battlefield. Satellite networks form part of the United Kingdom’s digital backbone. Instability in these links would complicate the distinction between accidental interference and deliberate hostile jamming. Essential services might suffer outages, while operators could be pushed onto less secure fallback systems, increasing overall vulnerability to cyber threats.
Military assessments emphasise the growing reliance on compact satellite terminals, including those smaller than 45 centimetres, for resilient operations in contested environments. These systems support drones, man-portable communications and other attritable weapons. Proposed rule changes would degrade their performance, constrain innovation in small-scale hardware and potentially lock the UK into dependence on a narrow range of large, US-based providers. Both GSO and NGSO satellites offer complementary strengths and distinct vulnerabilities; a balanced multi-orbit environment is essential to withstand threats ranging from electronic warfare to cyber operations and kinetic attacks on space assets.
Recent commercial developments, such as Amazon’s intention to acquire smaller LEO operator Globalstar on 14 April 2026, illustrate the rapid consolidation occurring in the sector. Without safeguards, the space domain risks moving towards dominance by a very small number of actors with minimal direct ties to the United Kingdom.
For Britain, the implications touch core questions of sovereignty and resilience. The ability to conduct successful military operations, protect critical national infrastructure and retain strategic autonomy depends in part on access to diverse, reliable satellite services. A regulatory shift that tilts the field decisively in favour of a handful of foreign mega-constellations would erode that autonomy and introduce avoidable strategic risk.
Ministers and senior officials now have both the opportunity and the responsibility to engage. The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, currently undergoing committee scrutiny, and the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill provide domestic mechanisms through which these risks can be addressed. A coordinated, cross-government position ahead of the ITU meetings is urgently required. Britain should work closely with allies to uphold the existing interference protections that have underpinned stable space operations for decades.
The technical nature of the debate - centred on concepts such as power flux density - can obscure its profound real-world significance. Yet satellites today support everything from precision strikes to everyday financial transactions. The rules governing their coexistence are therefore not abstract regulatory matters but questions of national resilience.
In a reasonable worst-case scenario, excessive concentration of control over orbital and spectrum resources could result in the loss of sovereign oversight of a critical layer of national infrastructure. Services vital to defence and public safety could become subject to disruption, degradation or constraint by actors beyond UK control. Resilience demands diversity of providers and technologies rather than reliance on any single external supplier.
The government must now determine whether it is willing to accept such risks or whether it will act decisively to protect Britain’s interests in the increasingly vital space domain. Early and robust engagement at both domestic and international levels will be essential to safeguarding the capabilities on which the nation’s security and prosperity depend.