Norway’s Type 26 Frigate Order Must Not Be Allowed To Impact The Royal Navy

In August 2025, Norway announced its decision to procure at least five Type 26 frigates from the UK, marking a significant milestone in British naval shipbuilding and international defence cooperation. Valued at £10 billion, this deal represents the UK’s largest-ever warship export by value and underscores the strategic and economic implications for the UK, its defence industry, and its role within NATO. This article explores the positive impacts - such as job creation, export success, and enhanced NATO collaboration - alongside the potential negatives, including Royal Navy ship diversions, extended Type 23 service life, delivery delays, and risks of ship cancellations under the Labour government. It also proposes strategies to mitigate these challenges.

Background to the Type 26 Frigate

The Type 26 frigate, also known as the City-class, traces its origins to the Royal Navy's Future Surface Combatant programme launched in 1998, aimed at replacing the ageing Type 22 and Type 23 frigates with a versatile, multi-role platform emphasising anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Development evolved through various iterations, including explorations of trimaran designs and a shift to the Global Combat Ship concept in 2010, culminating in a design contract awarded to BAE Systems; construction began in 2017 at Glasgow shipyards, though the planned fleet was reduced from 13 to eight vessels in 2015 due to budget constraints by the Conservative Government. To date, orders include eight for the United Kingdom's Royal Navy, six for Australia's Royal Australian Navy (reduced from nine in 2024 as the Hunter-class), 15 for Canada's Royal Canadian Navy (as the River-class), and at least five for Norway's Royal Norwegian Navy, confirmed in a £10 billion deal on 31 August 2025 to bolster NATO's northern defences. Representing a significant advancement over the Type 23 Duke-class, the Type 26 features a larger displacement of around 8,000 tonnes for enhanced endurance and payload capacity, a quieter Combined Diesel-Electric or Gas (CODLOG) propulsion system optimised for ASW operations, superior armament including a 5-inch Mark 45 gun, 48 Sea Ceptor vertical launch system cells, and 24 strike-length Mark 41 cells for missiles like Tomahawk, advanced sensors such as the Type 997 Artisan radar and Sonar 2087 towed array, and modular mission bays with facilities for two helicopters and unmanned vehicles, enabling greater flexibility in maritime security, counter-piracy, and disaster relief roles.

Type 26 v Type 31 Frigates

The Type 26 and Type 31 frigates, both integral to the Royal Navy’s modernisation, serve distinct yet complementary roles, reflecting their differing designs and capabilities. The Type 26, or City-class, is a high-end, multi-role frigate optimised for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), with a displacement of around 8,000 tonnes, advanced stealth features, and a CODLOG propulsion system for quiet operations. It boasts sophisticated armament, including a 5-inch Mark 45 gun, 48 Sea Ceptor cells, and 24 Mark 41 VLS cells for missiles like Tomahawk, alongside advanced sensors like the Type 997 Artisan radar and Sonar 2087 towed array, and modular mission bays for helicopters and unmanned vehicles. In contrast, the Type 31, or Inspiration-class, is a lighter, general-purpose frigate with a displacement of

approximately 5,700 tonnes, designed for cost-effective versatility in roles like maritime security and patrol. Built by Babcock at Rosyth, it features a simpler CODLAD propulsion system, a 57mm main gun, and up to 32 Sea Ceptor cells, but lacks the Type 26’s advanced ASW capabilities and missile versatility (Wikipedia, 2025-08-23). While the Type 26 excels in high-threat environments and NATO operations, the Type 31 provides economical, flexible deployment, with its lower cost enabling a larger fleet to maintain global presence.

The Type 26 frigate programme, led by BAE Systems as the prime contractor, involves a robust network of key contractors and suppliers, primarily based in the UK, to deliver its advanced design and construction. BAE Systems Maritime, operating from its Govan and Scotstoun shipyards in Glasgow, oversees the overall design, construction, and integration of the frigates, leveraging its £300 million investment in a modern “frigate factory” to enhance production efficiency. Key suppliers include Rolls-Royce, which provides the MT30 gas turbines for the CODLOG propulsion system, and GE Power Conversion, responsible for the electric motors and drive systems. Lockheed Martin supplies the combat management system and integrates the Type 997 Artisan radar, while MBDA delivers the Sea Ceptor missile system for air defence. Babcock International supports the programme with logistics and maintenance expertise, potentially contributing to component fabrication at its Rosyth facilities, and Cammell Laird in Birkenhead could play a role in modular construction if production accelerates. This supply chain, spanning 432 businesses, including 103 in Scotland, 47 in the North-West, and 35 in the West Midlands, underscores the programme’s significant economic footprint across the UK.

Positive Impacts

Economic Boost and Job Creation

The Norwegian order for Type 26 frigates is a significant boon for the UK economy, particularly for shipbuilding across multiple regions. The frigates will be primarily constructed at BAE Systems’ shipyards in Govan and Scotstoun, Glasgow, sustaining approximately 4,000 jobs across the UK supply chain, including over 2,000 directly at the Clyde yards. The UK Defence Journal highlights that the £4.2 billion contract for the Royal Navy’s eight Type 26s already supports 1,700 direct jobs and 2,300 in the supply chain, with Norway’s order extending this economic impact well into the 2030s.

Beyond the Clyde, other UK shipyards, such as Cammell Laird in Birkenhead and Babcock’s facilities in Rosyth, stand to benefit if production is accelerated to meet Norwegian and Royal Navy demands. Cammell Laird, with its expertise in naval refits and modular construction, could contribute to component fabrication or assembly, creating additional jobs in Merseyside. Similarly, Rosyth’s experience with Type 31 frigates positions it to support Type 26 production, potentially boosting employment in Fife. BAE Systems’ £300 million investment in modernising its Glasgow facilities, including a new “frigate factory,” enhances production capacity, but involving additional yards could distribute economic benefits more widely across the UK.

Export Success and Global Influence

The Type 26’s selection by Norway, following its adoption by Australia (Hunter-class) and Canada (River-class), cements its status as a world-leading anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platform. This export success enhances the UK’s reputation in global defence markets, demonstrating the competitiveness of its shipbuilding industry. The Type 26’s design,

optimised for ASW with features like an acoustically quiet hull and advanced sonar systems, meets Norway’s critical need to counter Russian submarine threats in the High North. This positions the UK as a key supplier to NATO allies, potentially opening doors for further exports.

The deal also includes industrial cooperation, with the UK guaranteeing Norwegian industry involvement equivalent to the contract’s value. This fosters bilateral economic ties and could lead to reciprocal benefits, such as Norwegian contributions to UK defence projects, further amplifying the deal’s strategic value.

Strengthening NATO and Allied Cooperation

The Norwegian order enhances NATO’s northern flank by creating a combined UK-Norwegian fleet of 13 Type 26 frigates - eight British and five Norwegian - designed to operate seamlessly in the North Atlantic and High North. The UK Defence Journal emphasises the interoperability benefits, noting that identical vessels enable joint training, maintenance, and potentially interchangeable crews, reducing costs and enhancing operational efficiency. Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre highlighted this partnership as a “historic strengthening of defence cooperation”.

This alignment strengthens NATO’s ability to counter Russian submarine activity, identified as a principal threat in the UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review. UK Defence Secretary John Healey stated, “Our navies will work as one, leading the way in NATO, with this deal putting more world-class warships in the North Atlantic to hunt Russian submarines”. The shared platform also fosters collaboration with Canada and Australia, creating a global Type 26 community that enhances collective defence capabilities.

Negative Impacts

Royal Navy Ship Diversion

A significant drawback is the potential diversion of at least one Royal Navy Type 26 frigate, likely HMS Belfast or HMS Birmingham, to meet Norway’s requirement for delivery by 2029. Navy Lookout suggests that this could reduce the Royal Navy’s frigate numbers temporarily, exacerbating existing capability gaps. With the Type 23 frigates nearing the end of their extended service life, any diversion risks leaving the Royal Navy with as few as seven frigates by 2029, a critical concern given potential threats in the Indo-Pacific and North Atlantic.

Extended Type 23 Service Life

The diversion and subsequent production demands could force the Royal Navy to extend the service life of its ageing Type 23 frigates. Navy Lookout projects a decline to just three Type 23s by 2029, with the last decommissioned by 2031, assuming no further delays. Extending their service life increases maintenance costs and risks operational reliability, as these ships are already way beyond their planned life extension refits.

Delays to Other Type 26 Deliveries

The Norwegian order may delay the delivery of the Royal Navy’s remaining Type 26 frigates. The first three ships (HMS Glasgow, HMS Cardiff, and HMS Belfast) are under construction, with HMS Glasgow due to enter service in 2028. Norway’s 2029 delivery requirement could push back subsequent deliveries, potentially delaying the full replacement of the Type 23 fleet until the mid-2030s. The UK Defence Journal notes that BAE Systems aims for a steady delivery of one ship per year from the fifth vessel onward, but integrating Norwegian orders could disrupt this schedule.

Risk of Labour Government Cancellation

The Labour government’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review, led by Defence Secretary John Healey, has already announced retirements of older vessels to address budget constraints. There is a risk that diverting a Type 26 to Norway could provide the Treasury with an excuse to reduce the Royal Navy’s order from eight to seven ships, further weakening the already shrunken fleet. This concern is amplified by historical cuts, such as the 2015 reduction from 13 to eight Type 26s.

Mitigation Strategies

Mitigating Ship Diversion and Fleet Reduction

To address the diversion of a Type 26 frigate, the UK government must commit to replacing any allocated ship to maintain the Royal Navy’s eight-ship order. Avoiding Treasury cuts is critical, and the economic benefits of the Norwegian deal could justify additional funding. The government could leverage the £10 billion export revenue to secure budget allocations for additional Type 26s, ensuring a net increase for the Royal Navy.

Managing Type 23 Service Life Extensions

To mitigate the strain on Type 23 frigates, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) should prioritise targeted refits to maintain operational capability, potentially involving yards like Cammell Laird, which has extensive experience in naval refits. Additionally, accelerating Type 31 frigate deliveries, which are less complex than Type 26s and built at Rosyth, could bridge the gap as Type 23s are phased out.

Accelerating Type 26 Production

BAE Systems’ new “frigate factory” in Glasgow and existing build halls provide capacity to increase production rates, but involving additional yards like Cammell Laird and Rosyth could further accelerate delivery. Cammell Laird’s expertise in modular construction could support component fabrication, while Rosyth’s Type 31 production line could be adapted for Type 26 sub-assemblies. Speeding up construction schedules could negate delays, potentially delivering Norwegian and Royal Navy ships concurrently. The MoD should incentivise BAE Systems and partner yards to expand their workforce and streamline supply chains, leveraging the economies of scale from a 13-ship production run.

Conclusion

Norway’s order for five Type 26 frigates is a landmark achievement for the UK, delivering economic growth, job security, and enhanced NATO cooperation. However, this order must

not be allowed to either reduce the Royal Navy’s order for eight ships (already reduced from 13) or impact on the replacement of the elderly and increasingly fragile Type 23 frigates.

The Royal Navy and Ministry of Defence must work with BAE Systems, partner yards and its supply chain to ensure that the benefits of recent infrastructure investments are realised in order to accelerate the construction of all 13 ships, ensuring that replacement of the Type 23s is not further delayed. The Royal Navy – and Britain’s security – cannot be compromised.