Britain’s Eternal Interests: Reclaiming Sovereign Defence and Foreign Policy

Britain’s foreign policy has long been guided by pragmatism rather than sentiment. As Lord Palmerston declared in the House of Commons on 1 March 1848: "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual." This timeless observation underscores a flexible approach to international relations, where alliances serve national priorities rather than rigid obligations. In today's volatile world, marked by great-power rivalry and shifting global orders, the United Kingdom must reclaim this sovereign realism to safeguard its security and prosperity.

Recent events highlight the urgency of such adaptability. At the World Economic Forum in Davos last week, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivered a stark assessment of the international landscape. He described a "rupture" in the world order, the end of a "pleasant fiction" where great powers once operated under shared constraints. Carney warned that geopolitics among major actors now faces few limits, with economic integration increasingly weaponised for coercion. Middle powers, he argued, must unite because "if we're not at the table, we’re on the menu." Great powers can act unilaterally thanks to their market size, military strength, and leverage; smaller nations cannot afford such isolation. While Carney focused on Canada, his message resonates profoundly for Britain: compliance no longer guarantees safety, and nostalgia for past arrangements is no strategy.

This rupture exposes vulnerabilities in Britain's current posture. The government's "NATO-first" defence strategy, while reaffirming transatlantic ties, risks over-reliance on alliances that may prove unreliable in a fractured era. NATO remains vital for collective deterrence, particularly against Russian aggression. Yet Palmerston's principle reminds us that interests evolve. The United Kingdom, as a sovereign nation post-Brexit, must prioritise independent capabilities over perpetual dependence. Excessive reliance on any single partner - be it the United States or European neighbours - could compromise strategic autonomy when great-power dynamics shift unpredictably.

UK Defence First has consistently advocated for this sovereign approach. The campaign emphasises defending the nation by sea, air, land, space, and cyber through domestic strengths. It calls for the ability to act alone when necessary, while welcoming partnerships that enhance rather than subordinate British interests. We need a robust domestic defence sector to supply sovereign capabilities, which will reduce vulnerability to external supply chains. Proposals for coordinated efforts among CANZUK nations (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) offer a pragmatic alternative, fostering shared R&D and procurement without ceding control. Such arrangements align with Palmerstonian flexibility: alliances based on mutual benefit, not binding entanglements.

The risks of complacency are clear. In a world where great powers pursue unconstrained ambitions, Britain faces threats from multiple directions: Russian hybrid aggression, Chinese economic encroachment, and instability in key regions. Underinvestment in hard power - evident in shortages of munitions, ageing platforms, and stretched forces - erodes deterrence.

True sovereignty demands political will. The United Kingdom possesses immense talent, a global outlook, and historical resilience. Yet strategic drift persists when defence is subordinated to short-term fiscal or diplomatic expediency. Reclaiming Palmerston's pragmatism means funding a military capable of independent action, modernising procurement for domestic industry, and pursuing foreign policy that places British interests first. Alliances should amplify strength, not substitute for it.

In this dangerous era, Britain cannot afford to drift. Enemies observe hesitation; adversaries exploit weakness; only true friends show reciprocity, dependability and respect. By embracing sovereign realism - guided by eternal interests, not perpetual alliances - the United Kingdom can navigate the rupture Carney described and emerge secure and influential. Defence and foreign policy must serve one goal: preserving Britain's freedom to act in its own name.

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Britain’s Eternal Interests: Reclaiming Sovereign Defence and Foreign Policy

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